Introduction
It is common practice, on the eve of Election Day, to call upon the public to exercise their right and vote. The argument is that by voting one can sometimes influence the outcome and secure the election of a preferred candidate. It turns out, however, that some popular voting rules may give rise to situations where one's vote results in the election of a less preferred candidate (compared to the outcome in case of abstention). Brams and Fishburn [l] pointed this out for the "plurality with runoff" rule, and coined the term "no-show paradox" to describe such situations.
In this paper we continue an axiomatic treatment of this phenomenon, originated by Moulin [3] . He introduced the Participation Axiom, requiring a voting rule to never give rise to situations of the type described above. He proved that if the number of candidates is 4 or more, this axiom is inconsistent with the well-known majority principle of Condorcet. Here we replace the simple majority in Condorcet's principle by a special majority, indicated by a required quota, and determine the range of values of the quota for which this inconsistency persists.
Definitions and result
We let N, the set of natural numbers, stand for the set of potential voters, and we let A = {~z,,az, . . . . a,>, a non-empty finite set, stand for the set of candidates.
We let L denote the set of all linear orders on A (i.e., PE L if PcA xA is irreflexrve, transitive and complete; IL1 =m!). We understand ~P!J as "candidate a is preferred to candidate b."
A profile PV=(P'),, V is an assignment of elements of L to the members of some non-empty finite subset V of M. Given a profile P" and Of WC V, we denote by P W the profile obtained by restriction of P" to IV. We let 9 denote the set of all profiles.
A voflng rule IS a function f: @+A. We understand f(P ") = a as saying that when V is the set of participating voters and their preferences are expressed by (PI),, v then a is the elected candidate.
A voting rule f satisfies the Partrcipatlon Axiom (PA) rf there do not exist I/c N with I< 1 I/( < 03, P"E B and IE V such that f(P"\{'})P'F(P").
Let q be a real number, +rqr 1. We think of q as a quota, or more precisely as the majority size required to determine binary comparisons of candidates. Indeed, given P "E .9 we define a binary relation Dom(q, P") on A by bDom(q,P")a * I{~E V: bP'a}I 2 q/VI.
We go on to define Core(q, P") = {a E A: for no b E A does bDom(q, P ")a}.
For a fixed q, a voting rule f satisfies the q-Core Condltron (qCC) is for all P"E@ Core(q, P ") # 0 * f(P ") E Core(q, P ").
Finally, we say that two properties of voting rules are consistent if there exists a voting rule satisfying both properties. We are ready to state the result (as above, q is any quota in [+, 1] and m 1s the number of candidates). In the special case q = 9, qCC becomes the classical Condorcet principle: if there exists a candidate who beats every other candidate by a majority (more than half) then this candidate should be elected. Mouhn [3] proved the result for this case (namely, PA and +CC are consistent iff m I 3) and conjectured that a result similar to Theorem 2.1 was true.
The proof of the "only if" statement in Theorem 2.1 will be carried out first for a particular case (in the following section) and then in its general form in Section 4. The "if" statement will be proved in Section 5. Further comments on the basic formulation, the result and a related open problem will conclude the paper in Section 6.
Illustration of inconsistency
For the case m =4, the theorem asserts that PA and qCC are inconsistent whenever +sq<$. Here we shall prove that PA and *CC are inconsistent. Our purpose in doing this is to illustrate how an apparently sensible requirement like qCC can force a violation of PA, which may seem paradoxical. In addition, the general proof will be easier to understand with the particular case in mind.
Consider a profile Pw described by: ajDom($, P ')a4Dom($, P ')a, Dom(9, Pv)a2, b does bDom($, Pv)a3. We conclude that Core(Q, P') = {a3).
Assume that f is a voting rule that satisfies both PA and *CC, and consider a sequence of profiles startmg with Pv and deleting the voters in V\ W one at a time, ending wtth Pw. By &CC, f(P') = a3, and by PA at each step in the process the elected candidate can only move downward in the preference a4Pal Pa3Pgz. Yet, by QCC, f(P w, = al, which is a contradiction.
Proof of inconsistency
We shall prove here that PA and qCC are inconsistent whenever m14 and + <q<(m -1)/m. Together with Moulin's result for q = 5, this will establish the "only if" statement in Theorem 2.1. We remark that our proof would break down for q = 9; this case genuinely requires a separate proof.
Let m and q be given, m L 4 and 4 <q< (m -1)/m. Consider a "profile" P w of the form:
2q 
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We have put the word profile in quotation marks because we only indicate the relative frequencies of the various preferences; furthermore, the indicated numbers may not be rational. Nevertheless, we shall consider the Dom relation and the Core for such "profiles", as they are determined by the relative frequencies of preferences. The number 6 is positive and small, to be specified later. Notice that the indicated frequencies add up to 1 and, tf 6 is small enough, they are all positive. 
respectively for the preferences present in P", and 1 -I for the new preference. The number I will be specified later (O<L < 1).
If the following four inequalities hold, we shall have Core(q, P ") = {a3}.
J(q+@ < 49
(1) l-n((2q-l)/(m-2)+1-q-6)cq,
l-A(l-q+6)>q,
n(l-(2q-l)/(m-2))>q.
(4:
Indeed, (1) and (2) guarantee that a3czCore(q, P"), (3) implies that a,Dom(q, PV)al and (4) ensures that aJ_ I Dom(q, P")a, for all j f 1,3. Suppose that we can choose 6 and 1 so that (l)- (4) are satisfied. Then we can construct actual profiles P WJ and P" approximating the mdicated relative frequencies, so that their respective Cores are {al} and (a3}= (Notice that all the inequalities above are strict, so rationality can be achieved.) Using P" and PW we can show that PA and qCC are inconsistent.
Thus it suffices to show that 6 and A can be chosen appropriately. The conjunction of (l)-(4) can be rewritten as I--For 6 = 0, the maximum on the left is less than 1 which is the minimum on the right. Hence for 6>0 small enough, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side, so 1 can be chosen in between. As this L will also satisfy O<L < 1, we are through.
Proof of consistency
We shall prove here that PA and qCC are consistent if q? (m -1)/m or m 5 3. Assume that mr 3. For P"E 9, define f(P") to be the first candidate in f14 Core(q, P 9, where the intersection ranges over those qE [+, l] for which Core(q, P ") # 0, and "first" refers to the fixed order aI, . . . , a,,, . It can be checked that f is well-defined and satisfies qCC for all q E [f, l]-this is true regardless of m-and moreover satisfies PA as well (this is actually shown in 131).
Next, assume that qz (m -1)/m. In order to define our voting rule in this case, we need some preliminaries. For P "E 9 and a E A we let w(P",a) = I{(i,c): IE V, CEA and aP'c}I.
For P"E B we denote B(P") = (aEA: @",a) L w(P",@ for all LEA}.
The candidates in B(P ") are known as the Borda winners. The following definition of a voting rule g is meaningful for mr2. For P"E 9, define g(P") to be the first candidate m B(P") (3 Core((m -1)/m, P") if this intersection is non-empty, otherwise let g(P") be the first candidate in
B(P").
The satisfaction of PA follows immediately from the fact that g(P ") E B(P ") for all P"E 9. As for qCC, the basic observation is that if bDom(q, P")a then By the defimtron of g it must be the case that Hence there is a cycle in P' for some ZE V, which is absurd.
Three remarks and an open problem
Remark 6.1. On strtzbegic voting. The classical problem in the theory of strategic voting was to find a voting rule with the following property: voting one's true preference is always in one's best interest, when the alternative available actions are voting any other preference. The Participation Axiom also requires that voting one's true preference always be in one's best interest, but here the unique alternative action is aostention. An important aspect of this comparison concerns strategic complexity: while it may be difficult for the voter to search for a profitable alternative action in the classical setup, the voter needs to check only one alternative in the PA setup. There is a significant difference in the results obtained with the two approaches. The classical problem turned out to have a negative solution: with 3 or more candidates, no "democratic" voting rule has the desired property (Gibbard [2] , Satterthwaite [4] ). The results on PA indicate that it is a demanding axiom, but there do exist democratic voting rules that satisfy it, notably the plurality and Borda rules. Finally, it is arguable that a more realistic analysis should incorporate both types of strategic behavior-casting an insincere vote and not casting any vote. We feel however that the effect of insincere voting would overshadow that of abstention in such a framework.
Remark 6.2. On the critical quota. Special majority quotas were originally introduced in an attempt to avoid the cycles that occur in the simple majority comparisons when there are more than 2 candidates. This goal is obtained-namely Core(q, P') # 0 for all PVe p-if and only if q > (m -1)/m. Our result here reveals that (m -1)/m is also the critical quota for reconciling PA and qCC. This suggests the following interpretation. As long as Core(q, -) is non-empty valued it admits a selection nice enough to satisfy PA; but when it assumes both non-empty and empty values, there is no way to select from its non-empty values and extend the definition to ail of 9 without violating PA. The validity of this insight is limited however by the fact that it does not account for the discrepancy in the results when q= (m-1)/m or when m=3 and q-3. ~1. in these cases Core(q,PV) may be empty, yet PA and qCC are consistent. Open Problem. There is an alternative way to apply Condorcet's principle to quotas higher than 3. Namely, for a given qE(+, 11, a voting rule f satisfies the qDommance Condltron (qDC) if for all P"E B and all a E A aDom(q, P")b for all ~)EA \ {a} * f(P") = a.
Clearly qDC is weaker than qCC, and qDC implies q'DC for q' >q (which is not the case for qCC). The conjunction /\q,,,2 q DC amounts to the classical Condorcet principle, which is #CC. The open problem is, given m 14, to determine the range of quotas q for which PA and qDC are consistent. In particular, we do not know whether this range is strictly larger than the corresponding one for qCC, i.e., qr(m-1)/m. In our attempts at this problem we succeeded only to show that PA and qDC are inconsistent for values of q which are relatively close to 4. The reader may observe that for our proof of inconsistency in Section 4 it suffices to assume that f(P") E Core(q, P") when the latter is a singleton, which is weaker than qCC but still stronger than qDC.
An interesting way to look at this problem, as well as other related problems, is in terms of colorings of a simplex. Let then this ques -orresponds to the problem of consistency of PA and qDC described above.
